The "We're still gonna lose but at least..." Dept.

[solicitr]

"The US military yesterday announced the death of an al-Qa’eda leader responsible for the civil war’s most significant attacks, destroying the al-Askari shrine in Samarra.

A statement said Haitham al-Badr, the top al-Qa’eda leader in Salahuddin province, was killed during an operation that mopped up 80 radicals last week."

This is on top af another AQ commander in Mosul, and two top Taliban in Helmand. Not a bad week.

[Voronwë the Faithful]

I don't know, solicitr. These individual deaths never seem to amount to much. The killing of former al quaeda of Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was hailed as a great victory, but it didn't seem to make much difference. It seems to me that as long as create enemies faster than we kill them, there will continue to be a net loss in safety and security.

[The One Ring]

There was an interesting set of interviews on NPR earlier this week, though an admittedly biased selection of English-speaking Iraqi's who were all well-educated and probably more pro-American than the average Iraqi-in-the-street would be. Not all had a favorable view of "the surge" by any means, but one man impressed with with his observation that it is nevertheless a small group of insurgents creating most of the trouble and the priority should be to arrest them. He blamed the Iraqi police for the lawlessness, implying without saying it directly that they were simply not doing their job.

Jn

[solicitr]

It seems to me that as long as create enemies faster than we kill them, there will continue to be a net loss in safety and security.

Ah- but that's based on the assumption they didn't hate us already....

Seriously: those who have been paying attention to operations in Iraq since the 'surge' actually started on June 19 have been cautiously impressed by the village-by-village, neighborhood-by-neighborhood suppression of insurgent activity, including a careful review by two prominent and vocal Iraq-war critics (who admitted their 'surprise.') No leader is irreplaceable- but removing one causes a period of disorganization and retrenchment,* especially if intel and prisoners are taken at the same time. *Provided the pressure is kept up*, this state of disarray can snowball.

I'm under no illusions about the likelihood of that sine qua non of a favorable outcome: an Iraqi political settlement. But let's not forget that AQI is a potent force committed to (and OBL-ordered to) carry out attacks on US soil- something it will be free to do once we pull out, unless it is massively degraded.

*Most especially since AQI's leadership and technicians are Afghan/Paki-trained foreigners, although native Iraqis comprise most of the grunts.

[axordil]

including a careful review by two prominent and vocal Iraq-war critics

Please tell me you're not talking about that awful Pollock/O'Hanlon NY Times piece. Both of those guys have been war supporters since the get-go. Calling oneself a critic to establish street cred when one has been everything but is the opposite of integrity.

From an NPR Interview, September 28, 2003:

LIANE HANSEN: Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution. He just returned from a Pentagon-sponsored visit to Iraq and he's in the studio. Welcome back, Michael. What's it like in Iraq?

MICHAEL O'HANLON: Well, it's obviously tough. It's a little better, however, than I thought for a couple of reasons. One is I think the counterinsurgency effort is going fairly well. Now obviously, you mention the number of attacks per day that continue; it's a real concern. We're still losing troops. Everyone's aware of that. The truck bombings in August were tragic. The assassination of the Governing Council member was tragic, but overall, the counterinsurgency mission seems to be going well in that we are taking out a lot more people than we're losing and I believe we're using force fairly selectively and carefully on balance.

There's some mistakes here and there. Also, security is pretty good in most of the country despite the fact that it's not good everywhere and that we certainly hear the reports of violence on a daily basis.

HANSEN: You say it was better than you thought. What were the surprises? Were there any?

O'HANLON: I would say that the main surprise for me was probably that one could travel around the country, even flying over contested areas, with relatively confident sense of security. There wasn't as much need to avoid certain areas as I might have expected.

There is obviously violence. There was violence in some of the regions that we visited on the days we were there. But you're talking about specific, isolated acts just like you would get in an American city. I'm not trying to say that this is a country at peace, but overall, we really do run most of the country together with our Iraqi partners and the resistance forces are very small pockets who operate only at a given moment here or there. . . .

HANSEN: The Defense Department this past week announced the mobilization of 10,000 soldiers from the Army National Guard. The Bush administration has been trying to get countries—actually, mainly trying to get countries to sign up for peacekeeping responsibilities. Is the contingent, do you think, of the 160,000 American and British troops in and around Iraq sufficient?

O'HANLON: My impression is it's roughly sufficient. I would probably go a little higher. But the bigger problem is just sustaining that number is going to be very hard, and that's the reason we have to call up more National Guardsmen.

Oooh, now that's criticism. There's a lot more where that came from, too. The amount of praise O'Hanlon heaps on Rumsfeld for his get in fast on the cheap plan in 2003 is considerable.

And there's Pollock, welcoming the guy who came up with the surge plan, Fred Kagan, to a presentation at Brookings--

We are delighted that Fred Kagan of AEI was willing to come over here today and be the lead speaker in this series. . . . I think you are aware that Fred's plan, as they are already presenting it, is starting to make a great deal of waves in Washington because they are coming forward and saying that it is possible to succeed there, that it may requires some additional troops, but that it won't break the bank and it is worth doing.

It is obviously a very important contribution to the debate because it is the first time that a group of serious people have sat down, worked out a plan by which they believe that both of these things. . . .

Scathing, isn't it?

As critics of war policy go, these guys are up there with, oh, Cheney.

[solicitr]

He blamed the Iraqi police for the lawlessness, implying without saying it directly that they were simply not doing their job.

It's not just that they're not doing their job- it's that they're often part of the problem. If they're not militia members or in their pay,* or acting as death squads, they're horribly corrupt (a tradition from Saddam's day), and frequently moonlight as mob enforcers. The populace distrust them- and not just for incompetence.

One of the repeated dynamics of the occupation, at least pre-Petraeus, has been the securing of a village or neighborhood by US troops, only to see the bad guys come back as soon as we hand it off to the police. The new Petraeus policy, straight out of his CoIn manual, is to recruit local tribes to handle security- and this has been paying off. (One of the most abject idiocies of the Garner-Bremer years was the Emerald City's ideological refusal to 'reinforce the backwards and undemocratic tribal structure.' Christ, I despise anti-pragmatists.)

To Don Rummy: It's the boots on the ground, stupid. All the hitech toys in the world are no substitute for the Mk I Grunt.


On a grimmer note: the British Army is reporting that Taliban forces are now equipped with Iranian-made weapons, especially EFP's. So much for the idea that the Ayatollahs would never ally with Salafists. Sunni, Shia, Arab or Persian or Pashtun: the enemy of my enemy is my friend.


* Far, far too often, US troops have discovered, sometimes the hard way, IEDs planted in full view of a police checkpoint which could never have been installed w/o their knowledge and consent.

[The One Ring]

To Don Rummy: It's the boots on the ground, stupid. All the hitech toys in the world are no substitute for the Mk I Grunt.

With this I agree, though I would add that in this situation a lot more of those boots need to be housing the feet of linguists.

the British Army is reporting that Taliban forces are now equipped with Iranian-made weapons, especially EFP's.

These kinds of reports, along with the new emphasis on AQI, I take with a grain of salt. If they didn't exist, they would be invented. There is no way for us know what part of this is newly-invented propaganda.

However, we in the peanut gallery can learn something about the history and the culture of the place and the parties to ancient conflict and the theory of warfare in general (including terrorism if we are smart enough) and there are some basic principles that do not change from century to century. It is possible, I think, to evaluate particular policies against likely success based on historic realities.

Jn

[axordil]

TOR, did you read the essay by the Canadian MP and polisci prof (titled Wrong on Iraq, but really more about the nature of political decision making in general) in the NYTimes magazine this weekend? Your last sentence would fit right into it.

[solicitr]

AX:

I didn't mean to imply that Pollock and O'Hanlon were anti-war. They have for a long time been, indeed, scathing critics of Rummy's and Bremer's mishandling of the war, and supporters of Kagan, Keane, and the other professional soldiers who first proposed the so-called 'surge.' I note that back in '03 O'Hanlon was saying that 160,000 was the minimum force level required: pretty much exactly the 'surge' figure. But it's also worth observing that by late '05, even before the Samarra bombing, they were saying that the campaign was FUBAR and it was too late to fix it. Hence their pleasant surprise at Petraeus' early progress.

I really dislike the use of 'surge' to describe a strategy, since it's merely a logistical term- it refers to a temporary increase of men or materiel in a particular place, not what one does with them; and using it as a shorthand for Petraeus' operational concept easily creates the erroneous impression that nothing more is going on than shipping in additional troops for the same-old same-old. Although I'm no fan of PR, you can't ignore it in a political and media world, and I think the Pentagon/WH missed a beat in failing to come up with a moniker for the Petraeus Offensive, beyond the Armyspeak codenames Arrowhead Ripper, Fardh al-Qanoon and Phantom Thunder.

[solicitr]

These kinds of reports, along with the new emphasis on AQI, I take with a grain of salt. If they didn't exist, they would be invented. There is no way for us know what part of this is newly-invented propaganda.

I don't deny there's reason to be cynical, but there's little reason to doubt the routine minutiae of patrols and house searches (never considered worth front-page coverage):

An Iraqi citizen tipped off U.S. soldiers to the location of an EFP in the Rashid District, which led to the capture of three members of an EFP cell after tracking the "command wire" back to a home. Soldiers found "a trigger device, four Motorola radios, a video camera, an Iranian Type-85 sniper rifle, a pistol, a spool of wire, three EFP tubes and three EFP plates" inside the home.

These Iranian EFP's, incidentally, are sophisticated factory-made weapons, not field improvisations or backalley machine shop jobs.

As to the British Afghan claims: there's little doubt when an armored vehicle is knocked out by an EFP- that lump of molten copper and fist-sized hole in the underside are dead giveaways.

[Frelga]

Well, this part:

O'HANLON: I would say that the main surprise for me was probably that one could travel around the country, even flying over contested areas, with relatively confident sense of security. There wasn't as much need to avoid certain areas as I might have expected.

There is obviously violence. There was violence in some of the regions that we visited on the days we were there. But you're talking about specific, isolated acts just like you would get in an American city. I'm not trying to say that this is a country at peace, but overall, we really do run most of the country together with our Iraqi partners and the resistance forces are very small pockets who operate only at a given moment here or there. . . .

Emphasis mine. I need a *gaping in disbelief* smilie. Like you would get in an American city? Kidnappings, explosions, inter-tribal warfare?

As to the bit of news that started this thread - my reaction is three-fold.

• It's got to be a good thing to take out a high-ranked leader of the enemy army.
• As V has said, these individual deaths have not made much difference this far. This is likely in part because we are dealing with an organization that is not strictly hierarchical, but rather cellular.
• Remember when we thought we just needed to take out Saddam?

The problem is still the same - we dismantled the (cruelly oppressive) governance system in Iraq, but there is nothing to replace it with that is not equally oppressive and even more corrupt.

[solicitr]

As V has said, these individual deaths have not made much difference this far. This is likely in part because we are dealing with an organization that is not strictly hierarchical, but rather cellular.

Yes, but. Even a cellular model is heavily dependent upon a trained cadre of operational planners, bombmakers, document forgers, moneymen, communications specialists, expert car thieves and so on, backed up by a much larger group of grunts, thugs, and suicide bombers. The latter are fungible and easy to replace. The former are not.

Decapitation is hardly new as an effective tactic- dating back at least to Towton, with the future Edward IV crying, "Kill the lords! Spare the commons!" The one really effective tactic the Brits learned from us in the Revolution was developed into Wellington's skirmishing doctrine, wherein a regiment's light company, often rifle-armed, would concentrate on picking off French officers and sergeants: in modern milspeak, degrading their C3 or command, control and communications.

Remember also that killing or, better yet, capturing a leader will bring with it documents, cell phones, hard drives... not only does the intel help us, but uncertainty as to how much their security has been compromised hobbles the enemy.

Nailing AQ leadership can also be viewed as a symptom or effect of one of two dynamics, both of them positive. If we bag a leader in a targeted operation, as we did with Zarqawi, it indicates that we knew where he was: Good intel. Specifically, it means that someone dropped a dime who was a) a friendly local, indicating a certain level of trust and cooperation, or b) a prisoner, suggesting either disaffection or effective* interrogation techniques.

If we nail a leader as part of an operation not specifically directed at him, it's an indication of an even better dynamic. The AQ playbook in Afghanistan and Iraq both, right from the start, has been for the cadres to bail out before an attack and leave the grunts to achieve martyrdom. If the cadre is caught, it indicates that they were either surprised or trapped- good tactical planning and execution. Example:

As the attack unfolded, about a thousand Iraqis fled their homes, and it was the job of C-52 to screen for al Qaeda. Some al Qaeda—who cross-dressed and tried to slip out as women—were caught when their disguises failed

The basic concept behind Arrowhead Ripper and the supporting Marne Torch is a break-the-mercury-bulb exercise: smash the 'bulb' at Baqoubah and channel the 'droplets' towards waiting troops.


* I certainly don't mean the foul CIA thumbscrew stuff for which the Bushies are rightly being pilloried. Effective interrogation is based on patience, intelligence, patience, empathy, patience, a degree of acting ability, patience, and above all having a lead butt. Nor is anything achieved by threats and shouting- the best subject is the one who decides his interrogator is his friend and confidant. (Yes, it's dishonest. Tough).

[solicitr]

As V has said, these individual deaths have not made much difference this far

But 'this far' is of limited relevance. While the MSM these six weeks have concentrated solely on the extra troops and (of course) the death toll, they rarely (except on page A16) mention the real story- that we have gone from defensive/patrolling/sitting duck mode to an all-out offensive: the biggest operation by far since Baghdad fell. It's plainly not enough to take down insurgents in disconnected incidents: the idea now (whether or not it works) is very different- keep up the pressure, never let up, don't allow them to regroup; dislodge, channel, trap and crush.

[Voronwë the Faithful]

The National Intelligence Estimate released yesterday confirms that modest gains have been made in the security situation. However, it paints a bleak picture regarding the more important question of the political situation in Iraq. From a Chicago Tribute story:

"Iraqi political leaders remain unable to govern effectively," the report concluded as it expressed deep doubts that al-Maliki's government can overcome sectarian differences. Implicitly, the report questioned whether al-Maliki is willing or able to help Iraq become a fully functioning country.

Meanwhile, John Warner, the senior Republican on the Senate Armed Forces committee has called for at least the beginning of a troop withdrawal as soon as this fall. Combined with the NIE report, that should provide additional momentum towards a significant change in policy over the next month or so.

[MithLuin]

Ooooh, solicitr said 'FUBAR' - I don't think I've ever heard anyone use that before. It was my dad's frat nickname, and (for obvious reasons) he wouldn't tell me what it stood for when I was little.

I am just glad that my sister's husband is non-deployable ATM.

If we pull out the troops, I hope we do so intelligently, and don't leave total chaos behind. We don't belong there, but the Iraqi people deserve something from us.

Oh, and as a comment - corruption in Iraq's police structure did not begin with Saddam. This is the Middle East we're talking about...a very, very long history, full of betrayals and conquerors and corruption as well.

[solicitr]

Warner's comments- pulling out 5000 "at the President's discretion"- are I think intended not as a conversion to Harry Reid's side, but as a threat to the Maliki government to get its s**t together. As V pointed out, however much military/security success Petraeus accomplishes, it's significant only insofar as it enables a political settlement. The latter is not possible without the former, and the former is worthless without the latter.

[Voronwë the Faithful]

Yes, that is true. And the NIE report certainly made it clear that it is the intelligence agencies' opinion that a withdrawal would just make things worse.

Basically, there is no answer. What a boondoggle the next president is going to have to deal with. It is ironic that there are so many people seeking the nominations, because it is going to be a really bad time to be in charge.

[The One Ring]

Sorry, I've been away for the last week or so.

TOR, did you read the essay by the Canadian MP and polisci prof (titled Wrong on Iraq, but really more about the nature of political decision making in general) in the NYTimes magazine this weekend?

No, I missed it. Wish I had seen it. I really hate, though, that so much of the Iraq discussion is oriented toward making political hay in the US and seems unrelated to real strategy in Iraq.

Warner's comments- pulling out 5000 "at the President's discretion"- are I think intended not as a conversion to Harry Reid's side, but as a threat to the Maliki government to get its s**t together.

I heard Warner's speech and that was my read on it, too. But I honestly don't see what kind of a threat this would be to the Maliki government. Musharif's grip on his government is coming apart and it can only help him to stand further from the US, not nearer to us.

Jn

[solicitr]

--From Wire Services

Last week there was not a single military casualty — Iraqi or U.S. — in Anbar, said Maj. Gen. Richard Sherlock, a Joint Chiefs spokesman. It is apparently the first time since March 2003 that could be said.

The numbers reflect the timeframe between mid-June — the peak of the troop surge President Bush announced in January — and the beginning of this week. The surge amounted to roughly 30,000 more troops in Iraq, hitting full-force with nearly 170,000 U.S. troops.

The numbers might be the most positive sign yet of progress against insurgent activity since January.

Sherlock also listed several other statistics that he said showed terrorist activity is decreasing:

— Violence in and around Baghdad is down 59 percent.

— Car bombs are down 65 percent.

— Casualties from car bombs and roadside bombs are down by 80 percent.


— Casualties from enemy attacks down 77 percent.

— Operations against Iraqi security forces are down 62 percent.

— Assassination attempts for sectarian reasons are down 72 percent.

[solicitr]

Speaking through an interpreter at a 31 October meeting at the Iraqi Islamic Party headquarters in downtown Baghdad, Sheik Omar said that al Qaeda had been “defeated mentally, and therefore is defeated physically,” referring to how clear it has become that the terrorist group’s tactics have backfired. Operatives who could once disappear back into the crowd after committing an increasingly atrocious attack no longer find safe haven among the Iraqis who live in the southern part of Baghdad. They are being hunted down and killed. Or, if they are lucky, captured by Americans.

Those last two sentences are really the key. Mao said "the people are the sea in which the guerilla swims." Well, it looks like the sea is drying up for AQI, thanks in part to smarter American approaches, but in very great part to AQI's religious zealotry and sanguinary approach to dissent.

In his last video, Bin Laden said a 'veil of darkness' was falling over Iraq, and castigated his followers there for lacking faith, courage and competence. Which I think we should read as very good news.