Bird flu

[River]

So there's a bit of a brouhaha brewing over some recent results in the study of H5N1 influenza (ak bird flu)

In a nutshell, the NIH funded research in how the current H5N1 virus might mutate to become more virulent. Two groups of scientists, one in Wisconsin and on in the Netherlands, succeeded in making a bigger, badder, and nastier flu and now they want to publish the results in Science and Nature (the top journals in any field). The trouble is, when anyone publishes anything in a peer-reviewed scientific journal, not only are you required to present your exact methodology (or at least reference away to another paper that has the method) but you're also required to share your materials. In the strictest ethical sense, you're supposed to share those materials with anyone who asks for it but in practice, no one sends so much as a molecule out without some reason to believe they will be handled properly. Under ordinary circumstances, everyone is happy with this system even though everyone knows that there's no guarantee the methods published won't be used to bad ends. The assumption and hope is that it won't. Maybe that's the dewy-eyed idealism that lies at the heart of science. In this particular case though, the US government has taken the completely unprecedented step of asking the researchers and the journals they are publishing in to censor their methods sections.

I'm guess they can do this because they wrote the checks, but I've never heard of the NIH taking such a step. And it gives one pause, because while the NIH has a point, the findings could be extremely helpful to bird-flu stricken areas and humanity as a whole. A potential compromise mentioned in the article is to censor the methods and allow the scientists to release the full details to reputable people who approach them (and since scientific communities tend to be close-knit, reputable means the principal investigators know and, even if they're rivals, respect each other). However, the move also throws the fodder of many laboratory bull sessions out into the public forum: what exactly do you do if you cook up something, be it a virus or bacteria, that could rip humanity to shreds? Do you even publish it at all? And if you do, what do you do with the samples? Or the methods?

I've never come up with a good answer to those questions, and over the years I've participated in numerous discussions. Molecular biologists and biochemists manipulate genes all the time and we're aware of the dark purposes the technology can be put to. And we don't want the stain the chemists put on their hands during WWI or the physicists put on theirs during WWII. So be assured we talk about it...and the students and post-docs at least come to no consensus.

Anyway, what do you thoughtful people think?

[Lalaith]

I think the main question that comes to me is, "Why do you create a super-virus that can kill all of humanity?" And the answer to that had better not be, "Because we can." IOW, don't do the science just for the sake of proving that you can do the science; if there's not a rather large benefit somewhere, then I think this type of science is dangerous and the stuff of apocalyptic sci-fi scenarios.

Honestly, I'm not sad that the NIH is asking the scientists to keep their methods private. There are too many nutjobs out there who would and could use that information for evil. Obviously, I do hope that the scientists would be willing to share whatever useful, beneficial knowledge they've obtained with others they trust.

[Maria]

They should censor not only their methods, but also the identities of the researchers and the lab involved, so they won't become targets for those who want to acquire the info at any cost.

[Griffon64]

I assume that not just anybody could create a super virus in their garage. I know very little about the mechanics involved in it, so I have to find out more about the process in order to gauge the likelihood that such information can be put to bad uses.

Absent that information, I think the compromise mentioned in the article seems reasonable.

[vison]

A story I thought I knew as "The Death of Grass" deals with this issue. When I google that title, it comes up with a novel and yet I remember a short story. I must have the title wrong.

In the story, a scientist develops a material that kills grass (maybe trees, etc., too, can't remember) and he also develops an antidote. He is suddenly the target of Evil Forces who want the formula, and he decides to hide.

They find him.

It's a good story, I won't give the ending away.

It's possible it's the novel, it's been YEARS since I read it.

Nope, it's not that novel. Dang. Dang. I wish I could remember it and I don't have time to look in the bookcase.

[River]

Actually, securing the labs' freezers is probably a better idea than censoring the methods, Maria and Griff. I'm not sure that you could just do this stuff in a kitchen or basement or secret lab in some cave somewhere. You'd need reliable sources of power because if things thaw they fry, very good ventilation, incubators, a sterile hood, PCR machines, a sequencer or access to one, it goes on and on. Not even all the labs on a typical university campus have this capability. And there's technical skill involved. It would be easier and cheaper to just break into a lab.

Unless it's a foreign government we're afraid of here.

I think the main question that comes to me is, "Why do you create a super-virus that can kill all of humanity?" And the answer to that had better not be, "Because we can." IOW, don't do the science just for the sake of proving that you can do the science; if there's not a rather large benefit somewhere, then I think this type of science is dangerous and the stuff of apocalyptic sci-fi scenarios.

The people who're making nasty things more nasty and publishing the results are doing it to test hypotheses. The way the issue is being framed it's hard to believe, but they really are trying to help. Basically, as I understand it, they're trying to figure out what kind of mutations would causes pathogens to be more transmissible or virulent and thus give public health officials some idea of what to look for (spot it before it starts, in other words). But there's no computer on Earth that can simulate this stuff, so after you've made your guesses about which mutations are bad news you need to test it the hard and scary way.

There are also, in all likelihood, people making nasty things more nasty for reasons that violate the Geneva conventions. These people do not publish their results, though.

[Griffon64]

Actually, securing the labs' freezers is probably a better idea than censoring the methods, Maria and Griff. I'm not sure that you could just do this stuff in a kitchen or basement or secret lab in some cave somewhere. You'd need reliable sources of power because if things thaw they fry, very good ventilation, incubators, a sterile hood, PCR machines, a sequencer or access to one, it goes on and on. Not even all the labs on a typical university campus have this capability. And there's technical skill involved. It would be easier and cheaper to just break into a lab.

What quantities are involved? Or it is easier to breed/duplicate/propagate a virus you already have as opposed to making one, I would guess, so you'd probably want to secure the stuff properly, too.

I didn't expect that it would be quick and easy to duplicate the results.

[River]

Not sure about quantities, but it's always easier to propagate a strain that's already been made than to redevelop it from scratch. Also, I've never tried growing virus, but with bacteria you could get a culture going with less than 0.1 mL.

[Lalaith]

Individual scientists don't scare me as much as governments do.

And, yes, I get that they're likely thinking, "I'm doing this to find a cure or figure this virus out or increase knowledge in this area." However, I think there could definitely be more caution and wisdom exercised. Sometimes you choose not to do something because the end result is simply too dangerous despite any knowledge that might be gained. (Might or might not be gained, mind you.)

I do think there's a fine line there and no easy decisions.

[Frelga]

Why not destroy the strain? Now that they have their methods, why keep it around?

I am less concerned about governments where it comes to something that virulent, because there is no way to secure your own borders. Sadly, there are plenty lunatic organizations out there that don't care how many innocent people they kill.

[Lalaith]

That's true, Frelga. Good point.

[River]

Why not destroy the strain? Now that they have their methods, why keep it around?

To study how it works. And, as I said, it's a lot easier to propagate something you already have than rebuild it. Also, you never throw anything away in a lab. You mark it "Bad" or "Not working" and put it away. Later, someone else will find it, ponder it, and put it away.

Though maybe they did destroy it. No one's saying if they kept it or not, or how nasty it actually is. About a decade ago, someone cooked up a flu variant that was so astoundingly nasty they destroyed it immediately. I'm not sure if they published the details or not, but they did announce what they'd done after they'd cooked and bleached and otherwise rendered their samples useless.

But, getting back to the general reluctance scientists have to throwing things away, did you know there are two samples of smallpox virus left in the world? One's in the US, the other's in Russia. There's a lot of concern about either of those falling in the wrong hands...but, then again, as Frelga pointed out, pathogens aren't exactly discriminatory.

[anthriel]

Well, and we have a vaccine for smallpox. It would be horrible if it got out, but we do have a defense.

Now if they messed around with smallpox genetics and rerouted that means of defense...

This is tough stuff. I am all for knowledge is good, and I think it is problematic to try to stuff a genie back in the bottle. However, this sort of thing is dangerous beyond belief.

It scares me, frankly.

[Frelga]

As anthy said, smallpox makes a better government weapon than flu. An evil tyrant could vaccinate his military beforehand, e.g. Also, a big chunk of the population is still vaccinated.

Anthrax now - that terrifies me.

[River]

Actually, if you know the strain, you can very effectively vaccinate for flu.

Small pox would pretty effectively wipe out everyone born after the early 70's. Then the Baby Boomers could truly rule the Earth...

[Primula Baggins]

The problem I see with trying to destroy the results and back up is that what one lab can do, another can repeat. The key information isn't the method they used; it's the fact that they succeeded. Destroying samples and censoring methods will slow that process, but it won't guarantee that no one else will ever have the same insight. Scientific results aren't unique secrets that no one will ever be able to recreate; they are descriptions of observable aspects of the real world. Whatever happens to this description, that part of the world is still there, waiting to be described by someone else.

[Maria]

Small pox would pretty effectively wipe out everyone born after the early 70's. Then the Baby Boomers could truly rule the Earth...

At a 30% mortality rate?

[anthriel]

Anthrax now - that terrifies me.

I thought we might have an anthrax last week! Had to report to the state, the CDC, had special couriers, FBI on alert: all very exciting. 'Course, it wasn't anthrax. But at least we got to practice.

I wonder if the vaccination I had as a child is still protective for smallpox? Hmmm... well, at least we can vaccinate for that (again), if it were to get out. And River's right, if we know the strain of flu, we can often get a really good vaccination in less than a year.

[Maria]

In this document it says:

Because immunity to the smallpox vaccine decreases over time,
DOD revaccinated personnel who had been vaccinated more than 10 years earlier.

I've had the vaccine twice- once as a child and once when I was in the Army. Since that's been over 20 years ago, though, I'm probably unprotected now. Except for the resistance that being a descendant of smallpox survivors gives me, of course.

[Primula Baggins]

I had the vaccination at 10, before going to Europe, but have no confidence that still means anything. I don't even have a scar.